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This paper analyzes welfare-state determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants - 
within and across countries - and their interaction with labor-market drivers of preferences. 
We consider two different mechanisms through which a redistributive welfare system might 
adjust as a result of immigration. Under the first scenario, immigration has a larger impact on 
individuals at the top of the income distribution, while under the second one it is low-income 
individuals who are most affected through this channel. Individual attitudes are consistent 
with the first welfare-state scenario and with labor-market determinants of immigration 
attitudes. In countries where natives are on average more skilled than immigrants, individual 
income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill is 
positively correlated with them. These relationships have the opposite signs in economies 
characterized by skilled migration (relative to the native population). Such results are 
confirmed when we exploit international differences in the characteristics of destination 
countries' welfare state. 
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Very useful comments were provided by Klaus Desmet, Pravin Krishna, Darren Lubotsky, 
Rod Ludema, Kevin O'Rourke, Cecilia Testa, as well as seminar audiences at the University 
of Ancona, George Washington University, Johns Hopkins-SAIS, Syracuse University, 
Trinity College Dublin, Warwick, the 2005 SAET Conference in Vigo, the 2006 AEA 
Meetings in Boston, the 2006 CReAM Conference on Migration at University College 
London, the CES-Ifo conference on the Global Economy, and at the 2006 Midwest 
International Trade Meetings in East Lansing. \ We must end welfare state subsidies for illegal immigrants...This alienates taxpayers and
breeds suspicion of immigrants, even though the majority of them work very hard. Without
a welfare state, we would know that everyone coming to America wanted to work hard and
support himself." Rep. Ron Paul, R-Texas.1
1 Introduction
No other facet of globalization has spurred as much public debate as the movement of
workers across national boundaries. Even within ideologically homogeneous groups often
contradictory positions emerge. U.S. labor unions, although now o±cially welcoming Latino
and immigrant members2, see their ranks and ¯le oppose growing in°ows of unskilled foreign
workers. Similarly, while Silicon Valley entrepreneurs trooped in front of Congress in 1998 to
obtain an increase in the number of H1-B visas, many conservative groups fear immigration
and have ¯ercely opposed the 2004 proposal of the Bush administration to grant illegal
immigrants legal status as guest workers.
A large portion of the discussion is fuelled by the income-distribution consequences of im-
migration. Native workers are concerned about new immigrants of similar skill levels because
they are wary of increasing competition3, inducing downward pressure on their incomes and
contributing to the growing feeling of uncertainty that accompanies globalization.4 On the
other hand, native workers welcome immigrants who complement them in the labor market.
A second and not less important dimension of the debate is represented by the welfare state
channel. In fact, the very existence in many destination countries of redistributive social
insurance programs is likely to have a magnetic e®ect on large numbers of immigrants, in-
terested not only in new job opportunities, but also in the bene¯ts that come in the form of
subsidized health care, unemployment compensation or provisions concerning dependants.5
While this type of labor °ows has the potential to represent a net burden for the public ¯-
nances of the destination countries, the same young immigrants have been portrayed by some
as the answer to the deteriorating conditions of the welfare state in destination countries
1Cited from US Fed News, August 8, 2005.
2See Watts (2002).
3For instance, the threatening \Polish plumber" has been often mentioned as heavily conditioning the
French vote against the new European constitution.
4See for instance Rodrik (1997).
5See Borjas (1999a), and Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002).
2with aging populations.
Regardless of whether immigration represents a net cost or bene¯t for the welfare system,
adjustments in the redistribution carried out by the welfare state are unavoidable. Impor-
tantly, this paper shows that the type of response carried out by the welfare state matters
in assessing the e®ect of immigration on various subgroups of the population. As a con-
sequence, individual opinions about migration - which re°ect the combination of its e®ects
through various channels - will be in°uenced not only by the labor market consequences of
population in°ows: They will also be shaped by the type of response to immigration adopted
by the welfare state. To shed light on these issues, we develop a theoretical framework of
individual attitudes towards migration in which the labor market and welfare state interact
with each other as drivers of opinions.
The analysis of the labor-market channel follows the previous literature.6 We focus on
two factors of production, skilled and unskilled labor, and assume that migrants can be
either complements or substitutes for native workers. We show that the probability that an
individual is pro-immigration is an increasing (decreasing) function of her skill in countries
where the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is high (low). The intuition is
that, when immigrants are unskilled, they reduce the relative supply of skilled to unskilled
labor in the economy, thus increasing the skilled wage and reducing the unskilled wage. The
opposite is true when immigrants are more skilled than natives.
More importantly, in our model we consider two alternative adjustment mechanisms
through which the welfare state of the host country can respond to an in°ow of immigrants.
For each welfare state scenario, we analyze the e®ect of an in°ow of either unskilled or skilled
foreign workers. While the former represent a net cost for the welfare state, the latter are
likely7 to make a positive net contribution to the system. In the ¯rst welfare{state sce-
nario we assume that, following immigration, the value of per capita bene¯ts is una®ected,
while welfare costs (tax rates) adjust in order to balance the government's budget. Assum-
ing a redistributive ¯scal system, we ¯nd that high-income individuals are more negatively
a®ected by unskilled immigration than low-income individuals - as they bear most of the
additional cost to the welfare system. However, they are more positively a®ected than low-
income individuals by skilled immigration. In general, under the ¯rst scenario, immigration
6See Borjas (1999b), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2005), O'Rourke and Sinnott (2004).
7As it will become clearer in section 3, skilled migrant workers are not necessarily going to be net
contributors to the welfare state, because di®erently from their native counterparts, they are endowed only
with labor{related assets.
3has a larger impact on individuals at the top of the income distribution. Under the second
welfare{state scenario, we assume instead that the adjustment induced by immigration oc-
curs through changes in per capita welfare bene¯ts, as tax rates are kept constant. Under
these assumptions, if immigrants are unskilled relative to natives, the burden of the worsened
¯scal position of the welfare state falls relatively more on individuals at the bottom of the
income distribution. In other words, unskilled immigration negatively a®ects low-income
households to a greater extent than their high-income counterparts. The intuition for this
result is that, in this case, low-income natives will be competing with immigrants for access
to public services. If immigration is instead skilled - and is thus likely to relax the gov-
ernment's budget constraint - it will lead to an improvement in the position of low-income
workers through the welfare state channel that is greater than for high-income individuals.
In general, under the second scenario, it is low-income individuals who are most a®ected
by immigration. To summarize, under the ¯rst welfare{state scenario we expect individ-
ual income to be negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in countries where
the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants is high (unskilled immigration), and
positively correlated otherwise (skilled immigration). Under the second one, we expect the
opposite type of cross-country pattern.8
Our empirical analysis, carried out using the 1995 National Identity Module of the In-
ternational Social Survey Program, ¯nds strong support for the model: It both provides
new cross-country evidence for the role of welfare-state considerations and reinforces the
results in the literature on labor-market determinants. In particular, using a direct and
indirect measure of the relative skill mix of natives to immigrants, we ¯nd evidence that
is consistent with the ¯rst public-¯nance scenario (according to which it is high-income in-
dividuals who are most a®ected through the welfare-state channel) and with labor-market
determinants of immigration attitudes. Our results show that, in countries where natives
are on average more skilled than immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated with
pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill is positively correlated with them. These
relationships have the opposite signs in destinations characterized by skilled migration. We
con¯rm the robustness of these results using an alternative data set, the European Social
Survey, carried out in 2002-2003 on a di®erent sample of countries.
8In order to simplify the analysis, we only consider two extreme cases in terms of the adjustment of the
welfare state. However, it is possible to extend this framework and consider intermediate cases, where both
tax rates and per capita bene¯ts adjust. In that case what will matter is whether the adjustment takes place
relatively more along one dimension, as opposed to the other.
4A growing literature in economics focuses on individual preferences9, as they represent a
primary determinant of ¯nal policy outcomes (Rodrik 1995). In this paper we study welfare-
state determinants of migration opinions, for two main reasons. First, public-¯nance issues
have played a key role in the historical debate on immigration. However there are only few
papers in the literature that investigate welfare-state determinants of individual attitudes10
and they either focus on a single country or do not exploit the variation in the data across
countries.In our analysis, instead, we investigate cross-country heterogeneity in the impact
of individual-level variables by taking advantage of the variation in the data both at the indi-
vidual and at the country levels. The second reason for this paper is methodological. In the
existing literature, the correlation between individual skill and pro-immigration attitudes is
interpreted as evidence in support of a labor-market competition story.11 For example, in the
United States and other countries receiving unskilled migration, the estimated correlation is
positive, which is consistent with the labor-market hypothesis. However, given that individ-
ual skill and income are positively correlated, the same pattern would be observed in the data
under the second scenario of our welfare-state model. In other words, it might well be that
skilled individuals are less opposed to unskilled immigration because they also enjoy high in-
comes and, under the second welfare-state scenario, are not in competition with immigrants
for public services. As a result, it is di±cult to separate the e®ect of the two channels on
individual attitudes. In general, any other determinant of pro-immigration attitudes which
is correlated with individual skill will give rise to a similar problem of omitted variable bias.
In order to isolate the labor-market channel, previous studies (Scheve and Slaughter 2001
and Mayda 2005) compare the correlation between skill and pro-immigration preferences
in the labor-force vs. out-of-labor-force subsamples. Any correlation should disappear for
individuals out of the labor force if the labor-market hypothesis is what is driving the result,
which is in fact what the previous literature ¯nds. In this paper we tackle the problem in a
di®erent way. By explicitly considering welfare-state drivers, our analysis provides a new and
more direct approach to di®erentiate between labor-market and public-¯nance determinants.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature related to this
9See, for example, Luttmer (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Blanch°ower and Oswald (2004),
Caplan (2002) and the literature surveyed below.
10See Dustmann and Preston (2004a), Dustmann and Preston (2004b), Hanson (2005), Hanson, Scheve,
and Slaughter (2005a) and Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005b).
11See Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Kessler (2001), Mayda (2005) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2004). See
Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2005) for an alternative interpretation of
the empirical evidence.
5paper, while Section 3 presents the theoretical model. In Section 4 we describe the data
used in the empirical analysis, whose results are described in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature
Our paper is related to di®erent strands of the literature. The ¯rst investigates the impact
of immigration on the welfare state, and has shaped the debate about immigration policy
in the United States, Europe and other destination countries. Borjas and Hilton (1996)
and Borjas (1999b), for instance, have extensively documented how immigrant households
that have relocated to the United States during the eighties and nineties are more likely
to receive welfare bene¯ts than the native population. While most of the existing gap in
participation rates can be explained by observable characteristics, this is evidence of the
growing pressure put on state and federal budgets by \New Americans".12 Boeri, Hanson,
and McCormick (2002), considering a large sample of EU countries, point out instead a
substantial dispersion in the immigrant's participation in the welfare state. Furthermore,
they show that while immigrants are on average more likely than natives to be on the
receiving end of unemployment and family bene¯ts, this turn out not to be the case for old
age pension bene¯ts.13
Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) analyze the extent to which, in the long run, immigration
a®ects the redistribution carried out by the welfare state. In a very elegant theoretical model
the paper shows how { somewhat surprisingly { the presence of a ¯scal leakage from the native
to the foreign born population is likely to play against redistribution towards the less skilled.
The intuition for this result is that, as the number of migrants grows, a larger proportion of
the ¯scal revenues ends up in the hands of unskilled immigrants, which implies that native
taxpayers { among whom the median voter will most likely be counted { will opt for lower
taxes. While in our paper the mechanism of welfare-state adjustment to immigration is taken
as given,14 we are going to exploit some features of Razin, Sadka and Swagell's (2002) model
12For an analysis of the long run e®ects of immigration in the US, see also Smith and Edmonston (1997).
13See Table 3.2, page 74. This argument has been used by many policy makers in Europe to highlight the
potential role of immigration policy as a tool to deal with the di±culties created by pay as you go social
security systems in the presence of an ageing population. For a formal analysis, see Razin and Sadka (1999),
while Storesletten (2000) has studied how migration policy can be used to sustain the existing welfare system
in the United States. See also Haupt and Peters (2003) and Casarico and Devillanova (2003).
14In particular, we assume that individuals take as given one of the two scenarios of welfare-state adjust-
6to develop the framework with which we analyze individual preferences in the presence of
redistribution.
The second set of papers related to our work looks, more speci¯cally, at how welfare-state
considerations a®ect individual perceptions of immigration. Dustmann and Preston (2004b)
empirically analyze attitudes towards immigrants in Great Britain using seven consecutive
waves of an individual-level panel data set, the British Social Attitudes Survey. This pa-
per o®ers a new approach to isolating the separate e®ects of three major determinants of
attitudes: racial feelings, labor-market concerns, and welfare-system considerations. The au-
thors develop a structural multiple-factor model which uses responses to various questions on
racial, labor-market, and welfare issues to estimate the direct impact of the underlying three
factors on immigration attitudes. The paper ¯nds that racist feelings have the strongest
e®ect on people's views about immigration. Using a similar structural multiple-factor model
on data from the 2002-2003 wave of the European Social Survey, Dustmann and Preston
(2004a) focus on economic variables and analyze three alternative channels through which
individual attitudes towards immigrants are a®ected: labor market competition, public bur-
den, and e±ciency considerations. The main result of the paper is that, out of the three sets
of economic determinants, fears about public ¯nance have the strongest impact on immigra-
tion attitudes. Besides the methodological approach, these works di®er from our paper since
the analysis focuses on a single country (Dustmann and Preston 2004b) or does not explore
the cross-country heterogeneity in the e®ect of individual-level variables (Dustmann and
Preston 2004a). In addition, the welfare state is implicitly assumed to adjust to immigration
through changes in the tax levels (as in the ¯rst welfare-state scenario in our model).
More recently, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005a) investigate the impact of both
public-¯nance and labor-market variables on individual preferences over globalization - in-
ternational migration and trade in goods and services - in the U.S. in 1992 and 2000. Their
empirical analysis shows that, while the pre-tax cleavages in individual attitudes - working
through the labor-market channel - are similar for immigration and trade, the post-tax cleav-
ages in opinions - working through the public-¯nance channel - are di®erent. The authors
conclude that welfare-state considerations are therefore important in explaining di®erences in
individual attitudes towards alternative globalization strategies. The role of the welfare state
ment, that is respondents do not perceive the adjustment type as endogenous to immigration. Therefore,
ours is not a political-economy model, and it is best suited for a short-run analysis. See also Ortega (2005)
for a long-run political-economy model of migration and the welfare state.
7channel in explaining attitudes towards immigration is also highlighted in Hanson (2005),
where a `rights{based' immigration policy is proposed to limit the burden put by unskilled
immigrants on the welfare state.15
From a methodological point of view, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005a) is the paper
in the literature closest to ours. However, while their paper focuses on the United States and
exploits the across-states variation in the data, our analysis is a cross-country one. From
a theoretical point of view, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005a) di®ers from our work
in that it does not consider the two public-¯nance scenarios we instead analyze, implicitly
assuming that the ¯rst one holds. Our analysis of the two scenarios is indeed motivated by
their account of the di®erent experience of California and Texas, two states that during the
eighties and nineties were the destination of large in°ows of mostly unskilled immigrants.
Both states faced serious ¯scal di±culties as a result of the 1990-1991 recession but their
two Republican governors reacted very di®erently to the new challenges. Pete Wilson in
California backed Proposition 187, aimed at excluding illegal immigrants from some welfare-
state bene¯ts. George W. Bush in Texas promised, instead, never to adopt a measure of this
type. We think that the di®erence between the policies carried out in California and Texas
can be interpreted in terms of the two scenarios we investigate in this paper. California has
a progressive income tax system, while Texas has instead no state income tax. Therefore, in
California high-income individuals were probably the ones mostly hit by immigration through
the welfare-state channel (¯rst scenario), while in Texas this was the case for low-income
natives (second scenario). Since high-income voters are important Republican constituents
in both states, the two Republican governors had an incentive to implement completely
di®erent policies. California's response to the growing ¯scal pressure created by immigration
was a reduction in transfers to immigrants - which relaxed the state's budget constraint - a
move that high-income Republican constituents largely supported. Texas, on the other hand,
did not need to adopt an anti-immigration stance - by reducing immigrants' access to public
services - as immigration was mostly hurting low-income voters through this channel. Finally,
from an empirical point of view, the main innovation of our analysis relative to theirs is to
incorporate data on the relative skill mix of natives to immigrants, which varies considerably
across countries and a®ects whether immigrants represent a net burden or bene¯t for the
15The basic idea is to di®erentiate the level of entitlement to public bene¯ts, depending on how long the
immigrants have been in the host country. The immediate e®ect of this policy would be a reduction in the
bene¯ts available to immigrants through the welfare state.
8welfare state.16
Finally, our paper is also related to analyses of immigration preferences which focus on
the labor-market competition hypothesis. Using data on the United States, both Scheve
and Slaughter (2001) and Kessler (2001) ¯nd that more educated individuals are more likely
to be pro-immigration, which is consistent with a labor-market story, as immigrants to the
United States are less skilled than natives on average. Mayda (2005) and O'Rourke and
Sinnott (2004) extend the analysis to a multi-country framework. Both papers ¯nd that a
key variable determining the sign of country-speci¯c correlations, between individual skill
and attitudes, is the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. Using both a direct
and an indirect measure, individual skill is estimated to be positively (negatively) correlated
with pro-immigration preferences if the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants
is high (low). Our paper ¯nds the same results but in a broader framework, where the labor
market interacts with the welfare state.
3 Theoretical Framework
To analyze the e®ects of immigration on individual attitudes we consider a simple two{
factors HO model with and without diversi¯cation in production, and we augment it by
incorporating a redistributive welfare system. If production is diversi¯ed, two goods are
produced. Alternatively, if the economy is not diversi¯ed, only one good is produced. We
can think of the two production factors as unskilled (LU) and skilled labor (LS). They are
combined using a constant returns to scale technology yi = fi(LU;LS) to produce output
i 2 1;2. We will assume good 1 to be the num¶ eraire, so that its price will be normalized to 1,
while p will be the price of good 2. The economy is populated by a set of N natives, indexed
by n, and by M immigrants, indexed by m. Each native is endowed with one unit of labor
(either skilled or unskilled) and with an amount en 2 feL;eHg of the num¶ eraire good, where
eH > eL. Immigrants are only endowed with either one unit of skilled or unskilled labor.17
16Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005b) use across-states variation in the skill composition of immigrants
to the U.S.. This paper estimates the impact of the latter variable on skill cleavages in U.S. immigration
opinions, but not separately for the labor-market vs. welfare-state channel.
17For a similar assumption, see Razin and Sadka (1999).





while the total supply of each skill is given by
Lj = ÁjN + ÃjM j 2 fU;Sg (1)





j Ãj = 1. The key variable in our analysis of the
e®ect of immigration is the migrants to native ratio, which is de¯ned as ¼ = M=N and which,
for simplicity, we will assume to be equal to zero in the initial equilibrium. Furthermore, the
number of natives will be held constant throughout the analysis. A change in the immigrants








where ^ Lj =
dLj
Lj etc. Let wj be the (before tax) prevailing wage rate, with wS > wU. Let
ci(wU;wS) be the unit cost function for good i. Wages and outputs are determined by two
sets of equilibrium conditions. Firstly, equilibrium in the factor market requires supply to















Secondly, perfect competition implies that ¯rms earn non-positive pro¯ts in equilibrium, i.e.
1 · c1(wU;wS) (5)
p · c2(wU;wS) (6)
Assume that the government intends to levy an egalitarian income tax. The literature has
suggested (Mirrlees 1971) that the best egalitarian income tax can be approximated by a
linear tax. As a result, we consider an income tax with a °at rate ¿, accompanied by a lump
10sum rebate b. The cash grant may be thought of as capturing the provision of free public
services, and for simplicity we are assuming that migrants are entitled to all public programs
available in the destination country. Thus, by design, our tax system is redistributive. The
government budget constraint can be written as
¿(wULU + wSLS + E) = b(N + M) (7)
Immigration a®ects the well being of the current residents through three possible channels:
the e®ect on the prevailing tax rates, the e®ect on the per capita transfers18 and the labor
market (wage) e®ect. The net income of a native n of skill level j is given by
I
n
j = (1 ¡ ¿)G
n
j + b, (8)
where Gn
























The ¯rst term represents the labor market e®ect, the second is the e®ect through the ad-
justment in the tax level and the third term represents the adjustment induced in the gov-
ernment's transfers to the residents. We will now consider the e®ect of immigration on the
utility of current residents under two di®erent hypotheses. First, we will assume that the
economy is initially diversi¯ed and continues to be so even after immigration has occurred.
Under standard assumptions19 this implies that the prevailing returns on skilled and un-
skilled labor will not be a®ected and we label this the `no labor market e®ect' case. Next, we
will consider the e®ect of immigration in an economy that to begin with is not diversi¯ed,
so that factor returns will be a®ected by changes in endowments.
18The ¯rst two channels work through the welfare state. In our model, we assume that the government's
budget constraint must be satis¯ed in each year. In practice, immigration might also a®ect the welfare state
through its impact on the accumulation of public debt. While explicitly modeling this scenario would render
the analysis more complicated, allowing for the accumulation of debt would only shift into the future the
choice between changing taxes or bene¯ts to accommodate immigration.
19In particular, if no factor intensity reversal occurs.
113.1 No labor market e®ect
To gain some intuition on the importance of the type of welfare state response to immigra-
tion in shaping individual attitudes, we consider a simpli¯ed setting in which one of two
alternative scenarios are possible. Under the ¯rst scenario, we assume that the per capita
transfer is held constant, and study how taxes should adjust. In the second, we will assume
that the tax structure is not altered, and study how the per capita transfer has to adjust to
maintain the government's budget in equilibrium.We start by analyzing the ¯rst scenario.




´j^ Lj = d¼ (10)
where ´j =
wjLj P
i wiLi+E for j = U;S is the share of labor of skill level j in total domestic
income, and ´E = 1¡´U ¡´S is the share of the initial endowment in total domestic income.










where ÁU ¡ ´U is the di®erence between the share of the unskilled in the initial population
and their share in the initial GDP. Since wU < wS, it follows immediately that ÁU > ´U.
Consider equation (11) and to begin with, assume that the share of initial endowment in
national income is nil, i.e. that ´E = 0. If the native and migrant skill compositions are
identical, i.e. if ¯U = 1, an in°ow of immigrants will not alter the current tax level. If
instead immigrants are less skilled on average than natives, i.e. if ¯U > 1, their presence
will lead to an increase in the tax rate. This is intuitive since in order to maintain the same
per capita transfer, a reduction in the per capita pre-tax income will require an increase in
the tax rate. If the share of the initial endowment in national income is instead positive, i.e.
´E > 0, the increase in the tax rate needed to maintain a given demogrant in the presence
of unskilled immigration will be even higher. As immigrants in our model are assumed not
to own other assets besides labor, even if they are as skilled as natives (i.e. ¯U = 1), they
represent a net burden for the welfare state and this will require an increase in the tax rate
to maintain the demogrant unchanged.20 The following proposition then holds
20A similar `¯scal leakage' e®ect has been modeled by Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002). Notice also
12Proposition 1 Holding the demogrant unchanged, an in°ow of unskilled immigrants is less
desirable for an individual the higher her pre-tax income. To the contrary, an in°ow of
skilled immigrants is more desirable for an individual the higher her pre-tax income as long




























[b + G(1 ¡ ¿)]2
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If immigration is unskilled, which implies ^ ¿






@G · 0. On the other hand, if
immigration is skilled, from equation (11) we know that ^ ¿
d¼ < 0 as long as ´E <
(1¡¯U)(ÁU¡´U)
(1¡ÃU)






@G ¸ 0. ¤
Proposition 1 tells us that, if the demogrant is held ¯xed, the redistributive nature of
the existing ¯scal system implies that the cost of an in°ow of unskilled immigrants will fall
disproportionately more on higher income natives. Similarly, if immigration is skilled in
nature, the higher income natives will be the largest bene¯ciaries since they will enjoy a
disproportionately large decrease in their net tax burden. To see how the relationship is
a®ected by a change in the extent of redistribution carried out by the welfare state, we need















[b + G(1 ¡ ¿)]3, (12)
which is negative as long as immigration is unskilled since ^ ¿
d¼ ¸ 0. In other words, the
negative relationship between individual income and pro-immigration preferences (under
the ¯rst welfare-state scenario, given unskilled migration) becomes more pronounced the
more redistributive the welfare system is, as illustrated in Figure 1.
that, the more unskilled immigrants are, the higher the tax increase required to maintain the demogrant

























Skilled migration Unskilled migration
Figure 1: First Welfare-State Scenario
Finally remember that, among natives, we can distinguish four di®erent types of in-
dividuals, based on their skill levels and asset holdings. Skilled individuals with a large
initial wealth endowment are the top income earners, while the low skilled with a low initial
wealth endowment will lie at the bottom of the income distribution. Agents with limited
initial endowment but highly skilled and low skilled agents with abundant assets occupy
instead the middle of the income distribution: Either one of the latter two groups could have
higher (gross) income than the other. Therefore the model allows for di®erential variation
in individual skill and income, which will be exploited in the empirical analysis.
We turn now to the alternative scenario, in which tax rates are held ¯xed and the ad-
justment induced by migration occurs through changes in the demogrant. Going back to
equation (7), totally di®erentiating we obtain
X
j
´j^ Lj = ^ b + d¼ (13)










If the share of the initial endowment in national income is equal to zero, as long as the
in°ow of immigrants has the same skill composition as the native population (i.e. ¯U =
141), migration will have no e®ect on the demogrant. On the other hand, since ÁU > ´U,
unskilled immigration (i.e. ¯U > 1) will lead to a decline in the per capita transfers,21 while
skilled immigration (¯U < 1) will lead to an increase. If the share of the initial endowment
in national income is instead positive, the reduction in the demogrant which follows from
an in°ow of unskilled immigrants will be even larger. In fact a positive share of initial
endowments in national income implies that natives are richer, ceteris paribus, than the
immigrants in the initial equilibrium. As a result the e®ect of unskilled immigration on the
demogrant, holding the tax ¯xed, will be more pronounced.
The following result characterizes the e®ect of immigration on the current residents.
Proposition 2 Holding the tax rates ¯xed, an in°ow of unskilled immigrants is less desirable
for an individual the lower her pre-tax income. To the contrary, an in°ow of skilled immi-
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[b + G(1 ¡ ¿)]2.
We have seen that with a redistributive tax system, unskilled immigration leads to a reduc-
tion in the per capita transfers (
^ b






@G ¸ 0. With skilled immigration,
^ b








@G < 0. ¤
The result in proposition 2 is fairly general and the intuition is straightforward. The
in°ow of unskilled immigrants will { for a given tax rate { reduce the demogrant paid to
every native. The reduction in the demogrant will have a larger impact on the individuals
with a smaller income. The opposite is true { that is, the increase in the demogrant will have
a more positive impact on low-income individuals { if immigration is instead skilled, and
21Furthermore, as is intuitive, the more unskilled immigrants are, the larger will be the reduction in the

































Figure 2: Second Welfare State Scenario
the share of the initial endowment in national income is small. To see how the relationship
is a®ected by a change in the redistribution carried out by the welfare state, we need to














[G(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ b]
[b + G(1 ¡ ¿)]3, (15)
which is positive if migration is unskilled as long as G(1¡¿) > b. These e®ects are illustrated
in Figure 2.
How do similarly endowed individuals fare in di®erent ¯scal systems? This question is
answered in the following
Proposition 3 If immigration is unskilled compared to the native population, a more re-
distributive welfare system will make each of its citizens worse o®. On the other hand, if
immigration is skilled and ´E < ´¤
E, immigration will be welcomed by each citizen.
Proof. Without labor market e®ects, an in°ow of immigrants will induce the following


















16while the government budget constrain implies that b = ¿



































Consider now the situation in which ^ ¿
d¼ = 0 (second welfare-state scenario). From equa-
tion (14) we know that if immigration is unskilled,
^ b
d¼ · 0 and, as a result, all natives would
prefer to be in a less redistributive ¯scal system. Similarly, as long as ´E < ´¤
E, if immigrants
are skilled, all citizens would prefer to be in a more redistributive ¯scal system. Turning to
the ¯rst welfare-state scenario in which the state responds to immigration by adjusting the
tax level to keep the demogrant unchanged (i.e.
^ b
d¼ = 0), equation (11) implies that as long
as immigration is unskilled, ^ ¿
d¼ ¸ 0 and, as a result, every individual will be more negatively
a®ected by unskilled immigration the more redistributive the ¯scal system is. ¤
3.2 With labor market e®ects
We turn now to the second setting, in which the economy is initially specialized in the
production of only good one. Factor returns are then determined by the following set of
equations









17Totally di®erentiating the equilibrium conditions, it is easy to show that the e®ect of immi-



























Li. From these two equations, we immediately see that only if immigrants
share exactly the same skill composition as natives, there will be no wage e®ects. If the skill
composition of immigrants is di®erent from that of the natives, then there will be wage e®ects.
From the concavity of the cost function, it is easy to show that the sign of the denominator
of equation 22 is negative22, and this implies that an in°ow of unskilled immigrants will lead
to a reduction of the wage of domestic unskilled workers, while the opposite will hold for
skilled workers.
Turning back to the e®ect of immigration on the welfare state when wages adjust, hold-
ing the demogrant unchanged (¯rst welfare-state scenario) and totally di®erentiating the




´j ^ wj +
X
j
´j^ Lj = d¼ (24)
Notice that in this case the tax base will not only be a®ected by compositional changes,
but also by e±ciency gains due to factor price changes. Rearranging, the impact on the tax
















On the other hand, holding the tax rates constant and allowing the demogrant to adjust
(second welfare-state scenario), the government budget constraint becomes
X
j
´j ^ wj +
X
j
´j^ Lj = d¼ +^ b (26)
22See Dustmann and Preston (2004a) for a proof.
















In both situations, we can see that now the e®ects on the two dimensions of the ¯scal
state will be mediated by the labor market. At the margin, labor is paid the value of its
marginal product, so a marginal in°ow of immigrants will leave the total remuneration of the




d¼ = 0) and have no e®ect on the redistribution carried
out by the welfare state. On the other hand, if the in°ow of immigrants is non{marginal




¢¼ ¸ 0) { these are the
gains from migration pointed out by Berry and Soligo (1969)23 { and relax the government's
budget constraint.
4 Data
To empirically investigate these theoretical predictions, we combine individual-level infor-
mation on immigration attitudes with aggregate data on the characteristics of destination
countries. In particular, we use survey results from the 1995 National Identity Module of
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1995), which covers advanced, middle-
income and developing economies. We restrict the sample and only focus on higher-income
countries: these are the best suited for the analysis of welfare-state determinants, given the
non-trivial size of their welfare states.24
To construct a measure of immigration attitudes, we use respondents' answers in the
ISSP survey to the following question: \There are di®erent opinions about immigrants from
other countries living in (respondent's country). By \immigrants" we mean people who come
to settle in (respondent's country). Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent's
country) nowadays should be: (a) reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the same as
it is, (d) increased a little, or (e) increased a lot". The survey format also allows for \can't
choose" and \not available" responses which we exclude from the sample. We also leave out
23See also Borjas (1995) for a proof.
24In particular, our sample includes countries with per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted) in 1995 above 8,000
international dollars: West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, United States, Austria, Italy, Ireland,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Spain, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovak Republic. Italy is excluded from regressions which use real income, as this variable is not available.
19observations for individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis, Pro Immig Dummy, is dichotomous and
equal to one for respondents who would like the number of immigrants to increase (either
a little or a lot) and to zero otherwise.25 Our empirical analysis is based on estimation
of probit models (the Tables report coe±cient estimates). All speci¯cations have robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering on country26 and include destination countries' ¯xed
e®ects27, to account for the impact of unobserved, additive, country-speci¯c e®ects. These
intercepts make it possible to net out the impact of any country-level variable which is
homogeneous across fellow citizens (for example, the linear e®ect of migration policy, of the
state of the economy, of the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants, etc.28).
Summary statistics for Pro Immig Dummy and all the other ISSP and country-level
variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The fraction of
individuals in the overall sample who are in favor of immigration is low (7.9%). However,
this fraction hides substantial cross-country variation. In Canada and Ireland, respondents
are the most pro-immigration, in Hungary the least. In contrast, attitudes are much more
favorable towards an alternative dimension of globalization, international trade. In the
overall sample, 28% of individuals welcome free trade, with the highest fraction being in the
Netherlands and the lowest one in Hungary.
Additional immigration questions are included in the ISSP survey. For example, indi-
viduals are asked whether they agree with the statement that immigration increases crime
rates and whether they think that immigration makes the country more open to new ideas
and cultures. We use answers to such questions to construct two variables, pro-immig crime
and pro-immig culture, which capture each individual's perception of the security and cul-
25We have checked the robustness of our results to various alternatives with respect to how the dependent
variable is constructed (for example, keeping the \can't choose" and \not available" observations; de¯ning
the middle category (c) as pro-immigration; using as dependent variable a ¯ve-valued ordered measure; etc.).
26There is not consensus in the literature regarding whether standard errors should be simply "robust" or
also "clustered by country". Therefore, we also run the regressions with standard errors set to be "robust"
and found very similar results.
27Fixed-e®ect estimation of a probit model may give rise to the so called incidental parameter problem
(Chamberlain 1984): the maximum-likelihood estimator of the incidental parameters (¯xed e®ects) is con-
sistent as T ! 1, for given N (assuming that there are T observations for each unit i = 1;:::;N) However,
it is inconsistent for given T, as N ! 1. Given that the panel data set we use is very long (N small, T
high, since there are many individual observations for each country), the incidental parameters problem is
not an issue in our case.
28Therefore, these country-level variables cannot be included in the estimating equations (unless inter-
acted with individual-level regressors) otherwise they would be perfectly collinear with the country dummy
variables.
20tural impact of immigration, respectively. In some speci¯cations we control for these two
regressors which measure two important aspects of the non-economic impact of migration.
By comparing two individuals who feel the same in terms of this dimension, we are better
able to isolate the economic channels.
The ISSP data set also includes information on a number of individual-level characteris-
tics that de¯ne the socio-economic background of each respondent (for example the age, sex,
number of years of education, real income, social class, political a±liation, and trade union
membership of the person interviewed). The two variables of interest for our analysis are
the individual's number of years of education and real income. We use data on the former
to construct a measure of individual skill (education) and test the labor-market predictions
of the model. We employ data on individual real income to test instead the predictions on
welfare-state determinants. In particular, the variable income is calculated using data from
the ISSP data set on individual yearly income in local currency and purchasing-power-parity
conversion factors from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2001).29
The theoretical predictions about the impact of immigration on natives' preferences,
through both the welfare-state and the labor-market channels, are di®erent (indeed oppo-
site) depending on the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants in the destination
country. Following Mayda (2005), we use two alternative measures of such skill mix. While
the ¯rst one is a direct measure, it can only be constructed for a limited number of coun-
tries, for which the following data is available. We use information on 1995 education levels
of both native and immigrant populations, which comes from the International Migration
Statistics data set for OECD countries (OECD 1997). Education levels are coded according
to the International Standard Classi¯cation of Education (ISCED): 1. less than ¯rst stage
of second level (ISCED 00, 01, 0230); 2. completed second stage of second level (ISCED
03, 04); 3. completed third level (ISCED 05 and over); 4. other general education, not
applicable and no answer. The relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is de¯ned
as the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations.
We measure the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, for both natives and immigrants, as the
number of individuals with education levels 2. and 3. divided by the number of individuals
with education level 1. In particular, the variable we use in the regressions, relative skill
29See end of Table 1 for de¯nitions of variables based on the ISSP questions.
30ISCED level 02 usually refers to individuals who have completed the ninth grade.
21ratio, equals the log of (one plus) the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants.31
The higher the relative skill ratio, the more unskilled immigrants are compared to natives.32
The indirect measure we employ for the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants
is the (log) per capita GDP of the destination country in 1995 (PPP-adjusted), from the
World Development Indicators. Consider the standard international migration model with
no productivity di®erences across countries. From a theoretical point of view, in this case
the relationship between destination countries' per capita GDP and immigrants' skill mix
(relative to natives) is unambiguous. High per capita GDP countries have a higher supply of
skilled to unskilled labor than low per capita GDP countries, therefore lower skilled wages
and higher unskilled wages. This creates an incentive for unskilled migrants to move from low
to high per capita GDP countries, while skilled migrants will tend to move in the opposite
direction. Therefore this simple model predicts that the relative skill composition of natives
to immigrants is high in higher-income countries and low in lower-income countries. If we
drop the unrealistic assumption of equal technology levels across economies, the pattern
of international migration in terms of skill composition is ambiguous, since rates of return
can be higher - than in the rest of the world - for both types of labor in a technologically-
advanced country. Therefore, in general, the relationship between destination countries'
per capita GDP and the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants becomes an
empirical question. Based on a sample of fourteen countries, for which data on both variables
is available (OECD 1997), Mayda (2005) shows that per-capita GDP in 1995 is indeed
positively and signi¯cantly correlated with the relative skill composition for the same year
(see discussion of this point and Figure 1 in Mayda 2005). Based on this evidence, we can
therefore use per capita GDP levels as a proxy for the relative skill mix. Our ¯rst set of
estimates (Table 3) is based on the latter indirect measure, as it is available for a larger
number of countries . Robustness checks in Table 4 use the direct measure for the relative
skill composition described above.
We also test the predictions of our model using information on the size of destination
countries' welfare states (labor tax rates and per capita bene¯ts), which comes from two
sources. Data on labor tax rates are taken from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), as
31In terms of the notation in the theoretical model, the relative skill ratio equals log(1 + ¯U=¯S) where
¯U=¯S > 1 if and only if ¯U > 1 (this is the case of unskilled immigration).
32The relative skill ratio measure is likely to understate the actual skill level of natives to immigrants, in
all countries, for two reasons. First, the immigration statistics used are for legal migration. Second, educated
immigrants often work in occupations that require lower skills than their education level.
22extended by Milesi{Ferretti, Mendoza, and Asea (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000). To
compute average labor income tax rates, these papers use ¯scal revenue statistics. Figures
on per capita transfers are taken from Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) and are based on
the OECD analytical database. Per capita transfers include both social security and other
transfers, such as unemployment and disability compensation, and are de°ated using each
country's CPI, and expressed in 1990 PPP equivalent dollars.
Our measure of the progressivity of the tax system in host countries is based on data
from OECD (1998). In particular, we use information on average income tax rates (that is,
personal income tax due as a fraction of gross wage earnings) for single individuals without
children who earn, respectively, 67% and 167% of the annual wage earnings of an average
production worker (see Table 1 in OECD (1998)). Our measure of the progressivity of the
tax system, progressivity, equals the di®erence in tax rates applied to these two groups.
Finally, we complement our investigation based on the ISSP survey using an additional
individual-level data set, the 2002-2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS), which
covers a di®erent (and larger) sample of countries than the ISSP33 and was run in a di®erent
period of time.34 The immigration question we examine in the ESS data set is also more
speci¯c than the one contained in the ISSP, as it focuses on immigrants of the same race or
ethnic group as the majority in the country.35 The main advantage of this more narrowly
phrased question is that it abstracts from racial and ethnic considerations, which usually
bias the estimates on individual skill and income. On the other hand, the disadvantage of
the ESS data set is that the income variable is not continuous, therefore it is subject to
measurement error.36
As before, we exclude non-nationals from the sample and construct a dichotomous vari-
able, Pro Immig Dummy-ESS, which equals one if the individual would like many or some
immigrants (of the same race and ethnic group as the majority), zero otherwise (that is,
if the individual would like a few immigrants or none). Summary statistics of Pro Immig
33As with the ISSP data set, we restrict the ESS sample and only focus on higher-income countries: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary.
34For more information on the construction of the survey, see Jovell and al. (2003). The data are available
from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.
35In particular, the survey asks: "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same
race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? 1. Allow many immigrants to come
and live here; 2 Allow some; 3 Allow a few; 4 Allow none; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer."
36See de¯nition of income at the end of Table 5.
23Dummy-ESS and the other ESS variables included in the regressions are presented in Table
5. The di®erent picture these numbers portray relative to the ISSP data set - in particular,
the higher fraction of individuals in favor of migration - is not surprising given that in the
ESS survey the immigration question is asked in relation to immigrants of the same race and
ethnic group as the majority.
Using Pro Immig Dummy-ESS as the dependent variable, we estimate probit models
which include, as regressors, country dummy variables and have robust standard errors
clustered by country.37 We combine the European Social Survey with aggregate statistics
on the destination countries of immigrant °ows. Data on per capita GDP of the destination
country in 2002 (PPP-adjusted) have been obtained from the World Development Indicators
data set. The relative skill ratio variable is constructed using 2002-2003 data on native and
immigrant populations by level of education (lower secondary education, upper secondary,
tertiary) from Table I.12 in SOPEMI (2005).
5 Empirical Results
As the theoretical model shows, the impact of immigration on natives' preferences through
the welfare-state channel is a function of individual income. On the other hand, the e®ect
of immigration on natives' attitudes through the labor-market channel is a function of in-
dividual skill. In our empirical speci¯cations, we will use both variables to disentangle the
two e®ects. Notice that, while not surprisingly individual income and individual skill are
positively and signi¯cantly correlated38, they are far from being perfectly collinear, which
makes it possible to analyze them in conjunction.
In particular, the theoretical model in Section 3 derives the following predictions. Through
the welfare-state channel, if per capita transfers are ¯xed, tax rates are adjustable and the
tax system is redistributive (¯rst scenario), the more a²uent an individual is, the less fa-
vorable he should be to immigration if he resides in a country where natives are on average
more skilled than immigrants. Thus, in such countries, the relationship between individ-
ual income and pro-immigration attitudes should be negative. On the other hand, under
the ¯rst scenario, richer households should favor immigration in countries characterized by
skilled migration. Therefore, in such countries, we would expect a positive correlation be-
37As recommended in the ESS website, our estimation uses both design and population size weights.
38Their correlation coe±cient in the overall ISSP sample is 0.34 (signi¯cant at the 1% level).
24tween individual income and opinions in favor of immigrants (Proposition 1). Next, under
the second scenario - that is, if the adjustment in the ¯scal position of the welfare state
due to immigration takes place through changes in per capita welfare bene¯ts with tax rates
kept ¯xed - still assuming a redistributive tax system, the correlations between income and
pro-immigration attitudes should have exactly the opposite signs for each type of skill mix
of natives to immigrants. We should observe a positive relationship between income and
pro-immigration attitudes in countries with unskilled immigrants relative to natives and a
negative relationship in countries with skilled immigrants relative to natives (Proposition 2).
Through the labor-market channel, skilled individuals should be more favorable to im-
migrants than unskilled ones in destinations characterized by unskilled immigration. In this
case, skilled (unskilled) wages are positively (negatively) a®ected since unskilled immigration
induces a reduction in the relative supply of skilled to unskilled labor. The opposite is true
for countries where immigrants are skilled relative to natives.
We bring these theoretical predictions to the data in Tables 3 and 4. We investigate the
empirical validity on average39 of either one of the two welfare-state scenarios, controlling
for the impact of labor-market e®ects.
Our initial set of regressions (columns (1)-(4), Table 3), where we assume a common
coe±cient on individual-level variables across countries, illustrate basic patterns in the data.
Ceteris paribus, older individuals and women are less likely to favor immigrant in°ows,
even though the latter e®ect is not always signi¯cant. These ¯rst results also show that it
is problematic to analyze the welfare-state variable on its own, independently from labor-
market and non-economic determinants of immigration attitudes. Richer individuals are
usually better educated than poorer ones, which has implications for their position in the
labor market and for their view of immigration from a cultural and security point of view.
For example, controlling only for the age and gender of the respondent, we estimate a
positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on income in regression (1). However, once we also account
for the impact of individual skill (equation 2) and of other non-economic determinants of
immigration preferences which are correlated with income (pro-immig crime and pro-immig
culture in regression 3; upper social class, trade union member, political a±liation with the
right in regression 4), the e®ect of income becomes insigni¯cant.
39In our analysis, due to the low number of country observations, we assume that all countries either follow
the ¯rst scenario or the second one. In other words, we test the validity of each scenario on average across
countries.
25We next let the coe±cients on individual skill and income change by country, as suggested
by the theory (regressions 5-7). In these regressions, we use per capita GDP as a proxy pfor
the relative skill mix of natives to immigrants, which is a key variable in the theoretical
model. Since data on per capita GDP is available for all countries analyzed, the sample size
is not a®ected. In particular, in column (6), we estimate the following probit model:40
Prob(ProImmigDummyi = 1 j xi) =
= ©(¯1agei + ¯2malei + ¯3incomei + ¯4incomei ¢ pcgdp
c + ¯5educi + ¯6educi ¢ pcgdp
c),
where ©(¢) represents the cumulative distribution function of a standard Normal, ¯ is
a vector of parameters to be estimated and xi is the vector of all explanatory variables
speci¯c to individual i, who is from country c. In regression (7), we augment this spec-
i¯cation by adding the two regressors pro-immig crime and pro-immig culture. Based on
these speci¯cations, we ¯nd evidence of substantial cross-country heterogeneity in terms of
the impact of both skill and income. The e®ect of the two variables is characterized by
the opposite pattern across countries. Our estimates show that, while the impact of educa-
tion on pro-immigration preferences is positive in higher per-capita GDP countries (¯6 > 0)
and negative in lower per-capita GDP countries (¯5 < 0), the e®ect of individual income
is negative in higher per-capita GDP countries (¯4 < 0) and positive in lower per-capita
GDP countries (¯3 > 0). Therefore, our results are consistent with a labor-market plus
welfare-state explanation of attitudes towards immigrants in a framework characterized by
¯xed welfare bene¯ts, adjustable welfare costs (tax rates) and a redistributive ¯scal system
(¯rst scenario).
Using the coe±cient estimates of regression (7), we calculate marginal e®ects for income
and education and their interaction variables and ¯nd that they are of the same sign (and
conventional signi¯cance levels) as the corresponding coe±cients.41 For example, while in
the United States doubling real income decreases the probability that the respondent is
pro-immigration by 0.7 percentage points, in the Slovak Republic it increases it by 0.8. In
the United States, one more year of education raises the likelihood by 1.2 percentage points,
whereas in the Slovak Republic it decreases it by 0.2 percentage points. While these numbers
40This speci¯cation, as well as all the other ones in the paper, also includes country dummy variables as
regressors.
41To calculate the marginal e®ects of interaction variables, we use the Stata command predictnl which
gets around the problems pointed out in Ai and Norton (2003).
26appear small, they are large in relation to the mean of the dependent variable which is only
7.9 percentage points.
Based on the regressors of the last speci¯cation (regression 7, Table 3), we also inves-
tigate the relative importance of labor-market and welfare-state determinants of attitudes.
We estimate a linear (OLS) regression using the ordered variable Immig Opinion as the de-
pendent variable.42 We start with a speci¯cation which only includes the socio-demographic,
non-economic and labor-market regressors (age, male, educ, educ*pcgdp, pro-immig crime,
pro-immig culture plus country dummy variables) and next add the welfare-state variables
(income, income*pcgdp). The di®erence between the two R2 measures is the fraction of
the total variance which is explained by public-¯nance drivers, after accounting for the
contribution of socio-demographic, non-economic and labor-market determinants plus coun-
try dummy variables. If we repeat the same exercise including ¯rst the socio-demographic,
non-economic and welfare-state regressors plus country dummy variables, and next the labor-
market variables, the R2 increases by slightly more than before.43 Therefore, while this paper
uncovers the signi¯cant role played by public-¯nance issues across countries, it also ¯nds that
labor-market determinants are marginally more important than welfare-state variables, in
terms of variance explained.
In Table 4, we check the robustness of the results in Table 3 in a number of ways.44
First, in place of per capita GDP, we use the direct measure of the relative skill composition
of natives to immigrants45 described in Section 4 (regressions 1 and 2).46 Although these
estimates are based on a smaller sample of countries due to data limitations47, they are
characterized by the same sign patterns as those using per capita GDP and by even higher
42Immig Opinion ranges from 1=\reduced a lot" to 5=\increased a lot".
43The di®erence in the two changes of R2 is half of a percentage point.
44For numerous additional robustness checks of the labor-market results, see Mayda (2005). For example,
Mayda (2005) shows that the correlation between education and pro-immigration preferences disappears if
the sample is restricted to individuals out of the labor force. This says that the e®ect of skill is indeed
working through the labor-market channel. The labor-market results are also con¯rmed when data on
individual occupation is used: respondents in occupations which experience a higher in°ow of immigrants
are less likely to be pro-immigration (Mayda 2005).
45The skill composition of immigrants is shaped by migration policy which, in turn, is a function of
attitudes. However, in an individual-level analysis such as this one, reverse causality is not an issue, since
each individual has an in¯nitesimal impact on the aggregate policy outcome.
46The skill composition of immigrants is shaped by migration policy which, in turn, is a function of
attitudes. However, in an individual-level analysis such as this one, reverse causality is not an issue, since
each individual has an in¯nitesimal impact on the aggregate policy outcome.
47Regressions (1) and (2) are based on the following countries: Germany West, Germany East, Great
Britain, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Spain.
27levels of signi¯cance (this is true for both the labor-market and welfare-state variables).
Based on speci¯cation (1), the estimates for income (0.137 signi¯cant at the 5% level) and
income*relative skill ratio (-0.1545 signi¯cant at the 5% level) imply that individuals from
countries with relative skill composition above approximately 1.43 are less likely to be in favor
of immigration the higher their income, while in countries with relative skill composition
below this threshold (Italy, Ireland, Spain, Sweden in our sample), the correlation between
pro-immigration attitudes and income is positive.48
Our next robustness check exploits the variation across countries in the size and pro-
gressivity of the welfare state. As often pointed out in the previous literature, the variable
income is likely to be associated with a substantial amount of noise. For this reason, in
regressions (3)-(5), Table 4, we follow Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005a) and estimate
speci¯cations where we use education as a proxy for the level of both individual skill and
individual income. In order to di®erentiate between the labor-market hypothesis and the
welfare-state one, we use data on the size and progressivity of the welfare state in each
destination country. In particular, in column (3), we estimate the following probit model:49






where RSR stands for relative skill ratio and bene¯ts represents per capita bene¯ts in
1995. The two terms °3educi and °4educi ¢ RSRc capture the labor-market e®ect, while the
following two terms (°5educi ¢benefitsc and °6educi ¢RSRc ¢benefitsc) provide evidence on
the welfare-state channel. If the welfare state is relatively small in a destination country
(small value of bene¯ts), we expect labor-market determinants to be the main economic
drivers of immigration attitudes. In this case, we should ¯nd that the impact of individual
skill is positive in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants on average
(°4 > 0) and negative viceversa (°3 < 0). On the other hand, the bigger the size of a
destination country's welfare state, the more important welfare-state determinants should
be in shaping preferences, and therefore the more likely it is that the e®ect of education is
consistent with Propositions 1 or 2. Recall that, using direct information on income, we
48Notice that these results are qualitatively similar when we interact each of the four main terms with the
1995 size of the immigrant in°ow, as a fraction of the destination country's population.
49This speci¯cation, as all the other ones in the paper, also includes country dummy variables as regressors.
28found results consistent with the ¯rst scenario of the theoretical model, where per capita
bene¯ts are assumed to be ¯xed and tax rates adjust following immigration (Proposition 1):
in this case, higher-income individuals oppose unskilled immigrants and favor skilled ones.
Therefore, in regression (3), we should ¯nd °6 < 0 and °5 > 0. These are indeed the signs
of the terms in education in regression (3). These estimates are based on a limited number
of countries, but they provide evidence which is consistent with our previous results, thus
con¯rming their robustness. The two sets of determinants - labor-market and welfare-state
ones - produce opposite results in terms of the impact of education.
The latter ¯ndings are con¯rmed in speci¯cation (4) that uses an alternative measure of
the size of the welfare state, i.e. labor tax rates. We ¯nd that, if labor tax rates are low,
the coe±cient on individual skill is consistent with the labor-market hypothesis (negative
and positive in correspondence of, respectively, skilled and unskilled migration) but has the
opposite signs if labor tax rates are high, once again strengthening our previous results.
Finally, we investigate the same set of issues by di®erentiating countries according to the
progressivity of their tax system (regression (5), Table 4). The theoretical model predicts
that the income-distribution e®ects of welfare-state variables should be more pronounced
the more redistributive the tax system is (see equations (12) and (15)).50 On the contrary,
with zero redistribution, the labor-market channel should prevail, even in countries with
sizeable welfare states. Our estimates in speci¯cation (5) are, once again, consistent with
these implications and with our previous results. To conclude, we believe that our main
speci¯cations and additional robustness checks provide strong empirical evidence for the
interaction of labor-market drivers of preferences with welfare-state ones, along the lines of
the ¯rst welfare-state scenario.
In the last column of Table 4 we consider respondents' preferences with respect to an
alternative dimension of globalization, free trade of goods and services. We use the same
regressors as in regression (1), Table 4 with Pro Trade Dummy as the dependent variable.51
Our goal is to investigate whether cleavages in trade attitudes mirror those for immigration.
If that was the case, we might worry that our results are not driven by the welfare-state
channel since trade openness is not likely to have as large an impact as immigration on
public burden in advanced countries.52 In any case, even if this were not true - that is,
50Of course, our underlying assumption is that a more progressive tax system is more redistributive.
51See de¯nition of Pro Trade Dummy at the end of Table 1.
52As Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005a) note, \immigrants may pay taxes, may receive public services,
and may vote over tax and spending choices. Imports, obviously, do none of these things." (p. 1). In general,
29trade liberalization signi¯cantly a®ects the welfare state53 - we do not expect the e®ect of
public-¯nance issues on trade preferences to be a function of the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants. As our results on trade preferences in regression (6), Table 4 show,
the e®ects estimated in our previous regressions are indeed speci¯c to immigration attitudes.
Finally, the results based on the ESS data set o®er empirical evidence which is remarkably
similar to what we found using the ISSP survey. As the estimates in Table 6 show, indi-
vidual attitudes towards immigrants in the ESS sample are on average consistent with the
¯rst welfare-state scenario (the coe±cient on income is positive and negative given, respec-
tively, skilled and unskilled migration) and with labor-market determinants (the coe±cient
on education is negative and positive given, respectively, skilled and unskilled migration). In
addition, using results from country-speci¯c regressions, Figure 1 presents similar evidence
on this cross-country heterogeneity.54 For each country, we estimated a probit model of
Pro Immig Dummy-ESS on year of birth, male, real income and education. The estimated
marginal e®ects of education (income) from these country-speci¯c regressions are then plot-
ted on the top (bottom) panel of Figure 1 as a function of the 2002 per capita GDP of the
destination country.55 The top graph shows a positive and signi¯cant (at the 10% level) cor-
relation between the host country's per capita GDP and the size of the e®ect of eduction (as
in Mayda 2005). On the other hand, the bottom graph displays the opposite type of pattern,
a negative and signi¯cant (at the 5% level) correlation between the destination country's per
capita GDP and the marginal e®ect of income. To conclude, given the di®erence in country
coverage of the sample, in the questionnaire date and wording of the immigration question
relative to the ISSP survey, the ESS results represent an important robustness check of the
conclusions of this paper.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple theoretical framework to study the e®ect of a
redistributive welfare state on individual attitudes towards immigration. We have highlighted
the ¯scal costs of trade adjustment assistance programs are limited.
53An alternative view is that trade liberalization has a considerable impact on the welfare state since the
demand for social insurance increases with free trade (Rodrik 1998).
54We constructed the same graphs using the ISSP data and they look very similar although, given the
smaller number of countries, the correlations are less signi¯cant.
55We use design weights for each country-speci¯c probit model.
30that this e®ect depends in a fundamental way on how the welfare state adjusts to an in°ow
of foreign workers. In particular, we have shown that high income individuals are worse hit
by unskilled immigration only if taxes are raised to maintain per capita transfers unchanged
(¯rst scenario). At the same time, agents at the bottom of the income distribution will su®er
more with unskilled immigration if tax rates are kept constant and the adjustment is carried
out through a reduction in the per capita transfers (second scenario). These relationships
are reversed in the case of skilled migration.
Using two di®erent surveys of individual attitudes towards migrants, we have brought the
predictions of our model to the data. Di®erently from the existing literature, we have carried
out our investigation taking full advantage of both the cross-country and individual-level
variation in the data. The results we obtain are on average consistent with the ¯rst welfare
state scenario, i.e. with an adjustment to immigration that is carried out through changes
in the tax rates. In particular, we ¯nd that high income individuals oppose immigration
through this channel in countries where immigration is unskilled and therefore a net burden
to the welfare state. The data suggest an opposite pattern when migration is skilled. In this
case the correlation between income and pro-immigration preferences is positive, which is
consistent with a situation where migrants are perceived as a net contribution to the welfare
state. In relation to the example discussed in Section 2, concerning California and Texas,
our results in support of the ¯rst scenario are not surprising. Texas { where the second
adjustment mechanism seems to be the relevant one { indeed represents a special case in
terms of its ¯scal system, since it has no state income tax.
More generally, we ¯nd that the income distribution e®ects of immigration as perceived
by individuals are less pronounced than pointed out in the existing literature. Individual skill
and income have opposite e®ects on individual attitudes. Since skill and income are positively
correlated, the labor market and welfare state channels partially o®set each other. For
example, the very same skilled and high income German businessman may feel ambivalent
regarding the arrival of immigrants since he might bene¯t from hiring them (labor market
complementarity) but be hurt by paying their way through the welfare state.
Finally, in our model we use the relative skill composition to capture whether immigration
will be a net burden or a contribution to the destination country's welfare state. In many
OECD economies, pay as you go social security systems are the main vehicle through which
retirement bene¯ts are paid. Thus, another interesting question to consider is how di®erences
in the age structure and fertility rates of natives relative to immigrants can a®ect individual
31attitudes towards immigration. This question represents an important direction for future
research.
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34pro-immig dummy 13605 0.0786 0.2691 0.0000 1.0000
pro-trade dummy 7966 0.2797 0.4489 0.0000 1.0000
age 13605 44.7291 16.0457 14.0000 96.0000
male 13605 0.5048 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000
log of real income 13605 9.1908 1.2025 3.9616 11.6643
education (years of education) 13605 12.0949 3.4868 1.0000 20.0000
pro-immig crime 13605 0.2711 0.4445 0.0000 1.0000
pro-immig culture 13605 0.5130 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000
upper social class 6364 3.4239 1.0982 1.0000 6.0000
trade union member 6364 0.4419 0.4966 0.0000 1.0000
political affiliation with the right 6364 2.8914 0.9559 1.0000 5.0000
Summary statistics for pro-trade dummy  are based on the same observations as regression (6) in Table 4.
Summary statistics for pro-immig dummy, age, male, log of real income , education , pro-immig crime, pro-immig culture  are 
based on the same observations as in regressions (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) in Table 3.
Summary statistics for upper social class , trade union member , political affiliation with the right  are based on the same 
observations as regression (4) in Table 3.
pro-immig crime is based on responses to the following question: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement?  Immigrants increase crime rates: 1=agree strongly; 5=disagree strongly." pro-immig crime=1 if answers to the above 
question are either (4) or (5); 0 otherwise. pro-immig culture  is based on responses to the following question: "How much do you 
agree or disagree with the following statement? Immigrants make (respondent's country) more open to new ideas and cultures: 
1=disagree strongly; 5=agree strongly." pro-immig culture =1 if answers to the above questions are either (4) or (5); 0 otherwise.
Table 1. Summary statistics of individual-level variables (ISSP data set)
Male is coded as follows: 1 male, 0 female (i.e., missing values are excluded). log of real income  is calculated using data in local 
currency on individual yearly income from the ISSP-NI data set and purchasing-power-parity conversion factors from the WDI 
(World Bank). upper social class  is coded as follows: 1=lower, 2=working, 3=lower middle, 4=middle, 5=upper middle, 6=upper. 
trade union member  equals one if the individual is a member of a trade union, zero if he is not. political affiliation with the right is 
coded as follows: 1=far left, 2=centre left, 3=centre, 4=right, 5=far right.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pro Trade Dummy is based on responses to the following question: "Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations 
between (respondent's country) and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(respondent's country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy: 1=agree strongly; 
5=disagree strongly; can't choose; NA." Pro Trade Dummy=1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5); 0 if they are 
either (1),(2), or (3). Can't choose and NA are treated as missing values.
Pro Immig Dummy is based on responses to the following question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent's 
country) nowadays should be ...: reduced a lot (1), reduced a little (2), remain the same as it is (3), increased a little (4), increased a 
lot (5); can't choose; NA." Pro Immig Dummy=1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5); 0 if they are either (1),(2) or 














benefits progressivity labor tax rate
United States 0.0805 0.1326 13.4257 9.6637 27395 3350 8.0000 29.1050
Norway 0.0743 0.2920 12.6633 9.6180 24694 5374 11.3000 40.6000
Japan 0.1568 0.3600 11.8682 9.6473 23212 7645 5.8000 29.3630
Canada 0.2061 0.2855 14.7612 9.9558 23085 1.6709 2433 11.9000 30.3440
Austria 0.0395 0.1679 10.3555 9.2601 22090 2.5329 6181 10.4000 39.6070
Germany West 0.0282 0.3854 10.9086 9.4788 21479 4.0923 4438 12.9000 40.2100
Germany East 0.0199 0.2312 10.9497 9.1904 21479 4.0923 4438 12.9000 40.2100
Netherlands 0.0547 0.3930 12.6851 9.9000 20812 2.6941 7166 15.9000 49.7960
Italy 0.0355 0.2315 11.0284 . 20513 0.6374 3475 8.8000 42.1830
Sweden 0.0671 0.2468 11.4111 9.5651 20031 1.3362 5879 11.0000 53.0110
Great Britain 0.0413 0.1433 11.3209 9.8841 19465 2.2523 2163 6.0000 24.5040
New Zealand 0.1159 0.2513 14.3098 9.5682 17706 2705 5.8000 24.9920
Ireland 0.1910 0.2260 12.2490 9.1528 17264 0.3950 2370 15.5000              
Spain 0.0844 0.1107 10.1275 9.0672 15163 0.4668 1899 10.0000 36.9000
Slovenia 0.0186 0.2619 10.6766 8.7888 12978              
Czech Republic 0.0244 0.2778 12.9111 8.6610 12426 4.9000              
Hungary 0.0148 0.0992 10.4914 8.1421 9315 16.9000              
Slovak Republic 0.0302 0.2566 11.8364 5.9451 8487              
gdp is the per capita GDP in 1995, PPP (current international dollars). The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native 
relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with 
levels 2 and 3 of education to the number of individuals with level 1 of education. The RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 1995. benefits is per 
capita transfers in 1995. progressivity is equal to the difference in average income tax rates applied to single individuals without children who earn, respectively, 
167% and 67% of the annual wage earnings of an average production worker (OECD 1998). labor tax rate is the 1990 labor tax rate. See end of Table 1 for 
definitions of pro-immig dummy , pro-trade dummy , education  and log of real income .
Table 2.  Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country (ISSP data set) and of country-level variables
R RProbit with country dummy variable 1234567
Dependent variable
age -0.0074 -0.0035 -0.0031 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0034
0.0017** 0.0014* 0.0015* 0.0025+ 0.0015** 0.0015* 0.0015*
male 0.0474 0.0739 0.1062 0.0609 0.0773 0.0756 0.1063
0.0412 0.0413+ 0.0414* 0.0614 0.0419+ 0.0419+ 0.0425*
log of real income 0.1243 0.0192 0.0205 -0.0032 0.0206 2.0979 2.3693
0.0385** 0.0381 0.0418 0.0622 0.0382 1.0828+ 1.0895*
log of real income*gdp -0.2099 -0.2371
0.1102+ 0.1107*
education (years of education) 0.073 0.0512 0.0697 -1.0792 -1.2332 -1.169
0.0133** 0.0112** 0.0169** 0.4279* 0.4315** 0.4205**
education*gdp 0.1168 0.1324 0.1236
0.0435** 0.0439** 0.0428**
pro-immig crime 0.5016 0.498
0.0783** 0.0801**
pro-immig culture 0.5913 0.593
0.0876** 0.0883**
upper social class 0.0426
0.0237+
trade union member 0.0086
0.0505
political affiliation with the right -0.1561
0.0566**
Observations 13605 13605 13605 6364 13605 13605 13605
Pseudo R-squared 0.1 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18
Pro Immig Dummy
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the 
constant is not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
See end of Tables 1 and 2 for definitions of variables. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects.
Table 3. Welfare-state and labor-market determinants using an indirect measure of the relative skill composition (ISSP data set)Probit with country dummy variables 123456
Dependent variable ProTrade
age -0.0054 -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0006
0.0023* 0.0020* 0.0020* 0.0023* 0.0019* 0.0013
male 0.0381 0.0803 0.0705 0.063 0.0728 0.321
0.0521 0.0616 0.0456 0.0552 0.0469 0.0384**
log of real income 0.137 0.1411 0.1203
0.0620* 0.0770+ 0.0434**
log of real income*relative skill ratio -0.1545 -0.1643 0.0574
0.0661* 0.0774* 0.0552
education (years of education) -0.024 -0.0382 -0.5194 -0.4269 -0.0723 0.0391
0.0082** 0.0076** 0.1715** 0.0990** 0.0434+ 0.0141**
education*relative skill ratio 0.1063 0.1006 0.5254 0.5012 0.2429 0.0359
0.0103** 0.0109** 0.3194+ 0.1023** 0.0534** 0.0096**
education*benefits 0.065
0.0210**
education*relative skill ratio*benefits -0.0551
0.0379
education*labor tax rate 0.0105
0.0024**










Observations 7641 7641 10451 9539 10451 7966
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.1
Pro Immig Dummy
Table 4. Welfare-state and labor-market determinants using a direct measure of the relative skill composition (ISSP data set)
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the 
constant is not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects. The relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the relative skill composition. See end of Tables 1, 2 for 
definitions of variables.pro-immig dummy 29248 0.6451 0.4785 0.0000 1.0000
year of birth 29248 1955 18 1893 1988
male 29248 0.4838 0.4997 0.0000 1.0000
real income 29248 2.8104 1.7746 0.1111 12.0000










Luxembourg 0.5429 2.6379 3.4873 59977 2.0547 8310.9470
Ireland 0.7775 2.7174 1.8867 35653 0.4043 3587.3380
Norway 0.7119 3.4791 3.7711 34750 1.4222 6951.4750
Switzerland 0.7981 3.2322 4.5611 31020 5.1932 7505.3120
Netherlands 0.6310 2.9866 3.4162 29550 1.6595 5543.4070
Austria 0.4276 3.2512 3.0337 29015 3.1415 6189.7400
Denmark 0.7482 3.1962 3.5789 28957 1.1638 7317.9740
Belgium 0.6764 3.0236 2.8084 27459 1.8042 5709.0030
United Kingdom 0.6345 2.9809 3.7550 27176 2.0380 5042.1450
France 0.6331 2.9979 2.3630 26613 3.5085 6309.9100
Sweden 0.8866 2.9907 3.2947 26468 1.4150 6587.4060
Finland 0.5808 2.8742 3.2209 26018 1.2446 5775.8980
Italy 0.7053 2.3389 2.2621 25554 . 5269.5770
Germany 0.7188 3.3340 3.2395 25546 5.6564 6065.6310
Spain 0.5433 2.1593 2.1309 22445 0.5475 3273.5390
Israel 0.7989 3.5000 1.9656 22003 . .
Greece 0.2754 2.2421 2.1162 18834 0.8266 3082.1880
Portugal 0.4377 1.7066 2.0345 18398 0.3275 2745.0350
Slovenia 0.6581 3.3278 1.5314 18018 . .
Czech Republic 0.5474 3.0845 1.8317 16556 2.6415 2444.1780
Hungary 0.4942 2.2740 1.0678 14159 0.6698 .
Table 5. Summary statistics of individual-level variables (ESS data set)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min
These summary statistics do not use design and population size weights.
Max
pro-immig dummy  equals one if the individual would like many or some immigrants (of the same race and ethnic group as 
the majority), zero otherwise (that is, if the individual would like a few immigrants or none). real income is household's total 
net income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12) divided by the number of household members. education (highest level 
attained) goes from 0 to 6 (not completed primary education; primary or first stage of basic; lower secondary or second 
stage of basic; upper secondary; post secondary, non-tertiary; first stage of tertiary; second stage of tertiary). per capita gdp 
in 2002 (PPP, constant 2000 international $) is from the World Bank.
The relative skill composition  (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant 
populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of 
individuals with upper secondary or tertiary education to the number of individuals with lower secondary education. The 
RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 2002-2003 (OECD 2005). benefits is per capita social expenditure 
in 1998 (at constant 1995 prices and PPP-adjusted).
Table 5 (cont.).  Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country (ESS) and of country-
level variables
Summary statistics in this table are based on the same observations as in regression (3), Table 6. These summary statistics do 
not use design and population size weights.
R R R RProbit with country dummy variables 12345
Dependent variable
year of birth 0.0049 0.0084 0.0045 0.0053 0.0063
0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0010**
male 0.0536 0.0734 0.0512 0.0454 0.0431
0.0296+ 0.0286* 0.0376 0.0437 0.0354
real income 1.3658 1.0075 0.0229
0.6598* 0.4151* 0.0132+
real income*gdp -0.1284 -0.0969
0.0647* 0.0407*
real income*relative skill ratio -0.0026
0.0087
education (highest level attained) -1.3381 -1.4043 0.1047 -2.7551
0.9378 0.8275+ 0.0453* 1.1820*
education*gdp 0.1489 0.1562
0.0921 0.0813+




education*relative skill ratio*benefits -0.3023
0.1407*
Observations 37879 30546 30405 26830 31553
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08
per capita gdp  in 2002 (PPP, constant 2000 international $) is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
Pro Immig Dummy-ESS
Table 6. Welfare-state and labor-market determinants (ESS data set)
real income is household income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12) divided by the number of household members. The relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the 
relative skill composition. The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both 
natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with upper secondary or tertiary education to the 
number of individuals with lower secondary education. The RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 2002-2003 (OECD 2005). benefits is per capita 
social expenditure in 1998 (at constant 1995 prices and PPP-adjusted).
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the 
constant is not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. As recommended in the ESS website, our estimation uses 
both design and population size weights. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects.Figure 1: The country-specific impact of education and income on immigration attitudes (ESS data set)
We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the squared standard errors of the country-specific 
marginal effects).The sign of the correlations does not change, but the level of significance increases.
The regression line is estimated using robust standard errors. The coefficient estimate is 1.74e-06, significant at the 10% level 
(observations for the Czech Republic and Luxembourg are dropped as they are outliers).
We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the squared standard errors of the country-specific 
marginal effects).The sign of the correlations does not change, but the level of significance drops.
The regression line is estimated using robust standard errors. The coefficient estimate is -2.21e-06, significant at the 5% level (the 
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